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This is an appropriate time to discuss the human rights
policy of the Carter administration, and some of the issues both
of principle and strategy which need further clarification. How-
ever, before considering some of the problems faced by the
Carter administration in its formulation and implementation
of a human rights policy, it would be useful to emphasize the
fundamental change which has taken place since this Adminis-
tration took office in January 1977. Under the Nixon and Ford
administrations, human rights was hardly considered a rele-
vant factor in U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking. Now it is a
legitimate factor in the decisionmaking process, and often does
influence the outcome of decisions.
As a further prefatory comment, the complexity of the
human rights issue in foreign policy should be underscored,
especially the difficulties in achieving progress in this field. It
is important to recognize the limitations of the United States'
influence to affect human rights change in any given country.
Governments believe that repression is essential for the main-
tenance of control. No matter how much they might value the
friendship of the United States, if they have to choose between
their own survival as a regime and their relationship with the
* Adapted from a presentation made at a conference on human rights, hosted by
the International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held in Denver-Boulder in Spring 1978.
** Special Consultant on Human Rights to the Committee on International Rela-
tions of the House of Representatives. Ph. D., 1973, New York University.
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United States, it is obvious which option they are likely to
choose.
Consequently, our efforts may have only a limited impact
on the status of human rights in the country concerned. In
many cases, the most that we may be able to achieve is to
dissociate our government from the repression in that country
by removing the supporting relationship which we have with
that government, particularly in terms of military and eco-
nomic assistance programs.
The Administration's human rights policy will be briefly
analyzed here by reference to bilateral assistance programs, the
Administration's role in the multilateral arena, and the Ad-
ministration's initiatives designed to promote human rights.
II. HuMAN RIGHTS AND MELrrARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
It was in the field of military assistance that Congress
placed the initial emphasis in relating human rights and U.S.
assistance programs, for military assistance provides the most
direct, symbolic, as well as practical, relationship between our
government and the repressive practices of foreign govern-
ments. Most repressive governments are military governments,
and the armed forces are frequently involved in day to day
law enforcement, and regrettably, in serious violations of
human rights. Perhaps one of the most blatant examples of the
military's role in repression is in Argentina, where the military
forces are involved in kidnappings, murder, and torture, with-
out identifying themselves as military personnel. Our own mili-
tary equipment may be involved in these actions, and the per-
sonnel involved may have received U.S. military training.
Consequently, military aid should be the first form of aid
sanction in the case of repressive governments. In 1974 Con-
gress adopted in its initial form section 502(B) of the Foreign
Assistance Act,' regarding military sales to repressive regimes,
which was revised and strengthened in 1976.2 Under this law,
all forms of military assistance and sales are to be denied to
governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights, unless extraordi-
nary circumstances necessitate such assistance. Under this
1. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795 § 502(B).
2. Foreign Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-330, 90 Stat. 771.
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provision the Department of State is required to submit an-
nually to the Congress a report on the status of human rights
in each country which is to receive either military or develop-
ment assistance.
Regretfully, except in a few instances, there is very little
tangible evidence that this legislation has been implemented
by the Carter administration. For example, while the Adminis-
tration made a serious effort at relating military assistance
with human rights in the relatively small country of Nicaragua,
even in that instance, the Administration's record has been
somewhat ambiguous. The Administration signed foreign mili-
tary sales agreements for fiscal 1977 and 1978 for Nicaragua,
but said it would not implement these agreements unless there
was improvement in human rights. However, it has decided not
to go forward with new bilateral economic programs for Nicara-
gua. Subsequently, however, it cancelled all military sales to
Nicaragua, including those in the pipeline.
Ironically, the most significant relationship of military as-
sistance and human rights has been taken at the initiative of
several recipient Latin American governments. In response to
the State Department's Human Rights Country Reports issued
in 1977,1 the countries of Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ar-
gentina, and Uruguay decided, on their own initiative, that
they would not accept U.S. military assistance. They did this
on the grounds that they felt that such treatment was insulting
to their national dignity. Subsequently, the government of
Guatemala reversed its position and requested military train-
ing assistance. Human rights violations continue in Guatemala
with serious allegations of government complicity in acts of
assassination and violence. More recently, the Governments of
the United States and the Philippines have reached an agree-
ment on the military bases which will entail interested U.S.
support for the martial law regime in the Philippines.
This reticence to relate military assistance to human
rights may be a result, at least in part, of (1) a tendency to
exaggerate the importance of our security assistance programs
to some countries which have been exempted from the human
3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN COUNTRIES RECEIVING U.S.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (Comm. Print 1977).
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rights considerations on grounds which do seem justified, and
(2) the inadequate focus which the Administration places on
human rights and military assistance programs. A few exam-
ples follow for illustrative purposes.
With respect to the Philippines, for instance, the import-
ance of our military bases has led this Administration to be-
lieve we are without any options with respect to military assis-
tance. It has been the Congress, rather than the Administra-
tion, that has invoked military aid sanctions with respect to the
Philippines.
The situation in South Korea is notably complex. More-
over, our policy of troop withdrawal, now somewhat amended,
has complicated the situation and diminishes possibilities for
military aid as leverage for human rights in that country. Nev-
ertheless, the linking of military aid with human rights is possi-
ble but has been foreclosed by this Administration.
In Indonesia our concern for maintaining friendly relations
has preempted use of military aid as a human rights sanction.
While, on the one hand, it is encouraging that approximately
20,000 of the long term political prisoners have been released,
about 10,000 remain detained without charges and trial. More-
over, the recent crackdown on the press and student protest
indicates that aside from the long term detainee problem,
human rights restrictions in Indonesia remain very real and
pervasive. An additional and significant negative factor in the
Indonesia human rights picture is the forcible annexation by
that government of the Portuguese territory of East Timor-a
clear case of naked aggression by Indonesia in violation of the
United Nations Charter. Moreover, the United States Govern-
ment concurs in the judgment of the U.N. General Assembly
that the Timorese people have not yet exercised the right of
self-determination. Nevertheless, we continue to provide mili-
tary assistance to Indonesia, and such aid was substantial in
facilitating the occupation of East Timor and continues to be
used today to suppress liberation fighters.
Another instance where the importance of friendly rela-
tions has compromised the Administration's commitment to
human rights is the case of Western Sahara.4 This is another
4. See Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976).
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non-self-governing territory which has been annexed, in this
case by Morocco and Mauritania, in contravention of United
Nations resolutions and the U.N. Charter principle regarding
the right of self-determination.' The Moroccan Government
has used U.S. military equipment in its efforts to control the
territory of Western Sahara. Although we have, through quiet
diplomatic representations, urged the Moroccan Government
not to use our arms in the Sahara, violations have occurred,
and we have not contemplated using military aid as a sanction
with respect to Morocco.
Perhaps the Administration has exaggerated the national
security considerations with respect to these countries. Clearly
these countries are important to our national interest, but that
does not foreclose the possibility of using our military aid, at
least in a limited form, as a sanction with respect to human
rights. Moreover, one can seriously question whether our na-
tional security rests on solid ground if it is dependent upon
alliances with repressive regimes.
With respect to the inadequate bureaucratic focus, while
the Administration has established the Inter-Agency Commit-
tee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance to deal with eco-
nomic issues, both bilaterally and through the multilateral fin-
ancial institutions, there is no comparable committee which
focuses on human rights implications of military aid. The
Inter-Agency Committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of
State, Warren Christopher, has representatives from the De-
partments of Treasury, Commerce, State, Agriculture, the
White House, and other relevant agencies concerned with eco-
nomic assistance programs and their human rights implica-
tions. This task force focuses solely on the human rights impli-
cations of particular economic aid programs. As a consequence
of this emphasis, the Administration has used economic aid as
a sanction in many instances. The United States delegates to
the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and
other international financial institutions have frequently either
voted against or abstained on loans or notified countries apply-
ing for them that the loans should be withheld temporarily
5. See inter alia Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra
in Retrospect, 10 TEx. INT'L L. J. 321 (1975); and Dinstein, Collective Human Rights
of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 102 (1976).
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until an improvement in the human rights situation takes
place.
It is ironic that the Administration does not have a compa-
rable committee to deal with human rights implications of mil-
itary aid, especially in view of the fact that such implications
are considerably more far-reaching than are the human rights
implications of economic aid. To meet some of these inadequa-
cies in the Administration's policy with respect to security as-
sistance, Congressman Fraser introduced during the mark-up
session of the military aid bill for fiscal year 1979 several
amendments' which served to tighten the restrictions on the
use of military equipment and military training with respect to
repressive countries. Although the Administration opposed
these amendments, eleven of them were adopted.
The first of three amendments clarifies the language in the
provisions of section 502(B). It deletes the word "policy" from
the language in the section that "it is the policy of the United
States that gross violators shall not receive military aid assis-
tance." By virtue of that language, the Administration had
interpreted section 502(B) as not providing a mandatory re-
quirement prohibiting military aid to gross violators except
under extraordinary circumstances, thereby permitting it to
provide military aid to gross violators even when there were not
extraordinary circumstances justifying such assistance. Conse-
quently, the provision on military aid and human rights had a
less stringent standard than the human rights provision to eco-
nomic assistance, which does not contain the "policy" lan-
guage.
The second amendment offered by Congressman Fraser
concerned the sale of equipment which goes to police forces and
other forces engaged in law enforcement activity. Such equip-
ment may be sold in several ways: (1) as military equipment
through the foreign military sales program; (2) as a commercial
item under the U.S. munitions list; or (3) as a commerical item
subject to the Department of Commerce's Export Administra-
tion Regulations. The Fraser amendment, which applies to all
6. For the text of these amendments, see COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS &
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1978,
VOLUME I, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 65-67 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
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the above kinds of sales of police equipment, prohibits such
sales to governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights, unless the President certifies in
writing that extraordinary circumstances warrant such assis-
tance.
Under prior Department of Commerce Export Administra-
tion Regulations, except for South Africa and Communist
countries, police equipment could be sold to any country with-
out a validated license. This had meant, in effect, that police
equipment sales could have taken place without review of the
human rights implications of providing such equipment to re-
pressive governments. Under the Carter administration, there
has been an effort to review some of these sales by virtue of a
voluntary agreement between the Department of Commerce
and the Department of State. However, since the exporters are
not required to have a validated license, the U.S. Government
was not fully aware of who was exporting what items and to
what countries. The category of crime control and detection
instruments under the Export Administration Regulations in-
cludes such items as leg irons, shackles, shotguns, shock ba-
tons, straight jackets, psychological stress analysis equipment,
dart guns, and even thumb screws. It is incredible that regula-
tions with respect to the sale of such equipment had been so
lax. The Fraser amendment on police equipment will rectify
that situation.
The third Fraser amendment provides that no country, the
government of which is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights, shall receive military training, un-
less the President certifies in writing that such assistance is
warranted by extraordinary circumstances. Of all forms of se-
curity assistance and sales, military training provides the most
profound relationship between the United States and another
government. When that government is engaged in gross viola-
tions of human rights such aid presents a special difficulty. It
needs no documentation that the military services are often the
ones engaged in repressive activities. It is true that under the
existing regulations, military officers who receive training are
required not to go directly into activities of a law enforcement
nature, thus limiting their involvement to matters concerning
the external defense of their country. However, this require-
1979
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ment obviously could not apply permanently to the personnel
concerned, and after about a year from the completion of their
training, they could be assigned to law enforcement duties. It
is interesting to note that while the Carter administration had
held up on the foreign military sales credits for Nicaragua,
until recently it had continued to allow military training to be
provided to the National Guard of Nicaragua, although the
National Guard has been the principal violator of human rights
in Nicaragua.
III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
It is desirable that high priority be given to pursuing every
avenue of promoting human rights through multilateral as op-
posed to bilateral institutions. On this score, the Carter admin-
istration has a good record. One could cite, among others, such
initiatives as (1) the efforts to encourage governments to permit
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit their
countries; (2) the efforts to encourage other donor governments
within the international financial institutions to take human
rights into account in their policies; and (3) the efforts to en-
courage the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to take con-
structive steps to respond to violations of human rights. On the
other hand, this Administration's decision to withdraw from
the U.N. agency which is doing the most effective work in
human rights, the International Labor Organization, was a
great disappointment.
The Administration's decision to sign and support ratifica-
tion of the various human rights conventions-the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,7 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,8 the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation,' and the American Convention on Human Rights10-is
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
9. The Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969).
10. American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969 O.A.S. Official
Records, OEA/Ser.KXVI/1.1, Doc. 65 Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970), reprinted in 9
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 99 (1970).
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commendable. While the Administration has sent these con-
ventions to the Senate for ratification, unfortunately, it has
attached to these treaties a series of reservations, understand-
ings, and declarations which could seriously undermine the
impact of U.S. ratification. The critics could accuse the Ad-
ministration of purportedly signaling to the Senate that ratifi-
cation of these treaties should not have any effect on our laws
and practices even when they are clearly deficient.
Ratification of these treaties with the Administration-
recommended reservations, understandings, and declarations
would expose us to charges that our commitment to the rule of
international law in human rights is halfhearted at best. More-
over, such action could set an unhealthy precedent for other
governments and thus might lead to a weakening of the inter-
national standards. It will be desirable for the Administration
to reconsider its position on this issue.
Thus, while there are some misgivings with respect to the
Carter administration's human rights policy, it should, how-
ever, be emphasized that many aspects of this Administra-
tion's commitment to human rights are well deserving of
praise. For example, the effort which the U.S. has placed on
increasing the effectiveness of multilateral institutions in the
field of human rights, such as the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and the United Nations, especially its Com-
mission on Human Rights, marks a striking departure from
past U.S. practices.
IV. POSmVE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A brief comment on two congressional initiatives which
sought to improve human rights through positive measures is
in order. At the initiative of Congressmen Fraser and Fascell,
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted in May 1978
a bill to establish an Institute for International Human
Rights." The bill provides that the Institute would be an inde-
pendent agency of the United States Government, providing
assistance for programs to promote universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Assis-
tance would be provided primarily to nongovernmental and
ii. H.R. 12598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H3948 (daily ed. May 5,
1978).
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international orgainizations in that field. Assistance could be
for such programs as conferences and seminars, publication of
works that have been suppressed, research, fellowships, assis-
tance to victims of persecution, and assistance for the legal
defense of political dissidents. The bill provides the Institute
with a broad mandate-its assistance can be for organizations
both within the United States and abroad.
The Institute would be governed by a Board of Directors
of seven members, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, from among individuals who have
demonstrated a concern for human rights and fundamental
freedoms. No officer or employee of the federal government
may be appointed as the Director, thus insuring its independ-
ence. The Board would select an Executive Director who would
be the chief executive officer of the Institute. The bill author-
ized $1 million for fiscal year 1979.
The subcommittees held three hearings on this bill. Con-
siderable attention was given to the importance of the inde-
pendence of the Institute from the Department of State. For
these reasons, a section of the original bill which attempted to
formalize that relationship was deleted from the bill. It is inter-
esting to note that the Department itself preferred this arrange-
ment, thus relieving it of any responsibilities for the Institute's
actions.
Another concern of the witnesses was that the Institute not
compromise the independence and autonomy of nongovern-
mental organizations. This concern obviously relates to ensur-
ing the independence of the Institute, which would be essential
to guarantee that the independence of the nongovernmental
organizations is not compromised. This concern is particularly
felt in terms of gaining receptivity by nongovernmental organi-
zations in foreign countries to receiving funding from the Insti-
tute. Obviously, there are many groups that would not wish to
receive Institute funds, and this is a position which one can
highly respect.
Another concern expressed by witnesses was for the Insti-
tute to be politically objective and to demonstrate its concerns
through its assistance programs regarding violations of human
rights by both leftist and rightist governments. The independ-
ence of the Institute should help to ensure this quality as well,
VOL. 8:525
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and it was hoped that the Administration would appoint mem-
bers to the Board who have this concern in mind.
The Institute could have provided us with an additional
approach to pursue the advancement of human rights: an Insti-
tute not tied to any particular Administration, and an Institute
which could by its actions receive acceptance both by the non-
governmental community here as well as abroad. Unfortun-
ately, an amendment was offered on the floor of the House to
defeat the Institute which was adopted." Few members, of
course, had detailed knowledge about the Institute. It appeared
that most members voted against the Institute because of a
general opposition to establishing new governmental agencies.
Perhaps the Congress and the Administration will reconsider
this proposal. An argument which is quite persuasive in favor
of the Institute is that it would continue beyond a particular
administration and, hopefully, would not be affected by
changes in the human rights policy from one administration to
the next. The Institute would thus provide a permanent and
continuing commitment to human rights by the United States
Government and not be subject to transitory political designs.
Meanwhile, through another initiative by Congressman
Fraser, the Agency for International Development (AID) is pro-
viding funding for programs and activities which promote civil
and political rights. Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance
Act 3 encourages AID to spend up to $1.5 million in fiscal year
1979 for such programs. The projects thus far approved serve a
variety of purposes: some are educational in nature, some serve
to increase communication between various national groups
struggling to defend human rights in different countries, and
some provide assistance to such groups. It may be hoped that
the success of the AID program will testify as to the usefulness
of creating an Institute along the lines of the Fascell-Fraser bill.
V. CONCLUSION
On balance, the Carter administration's human rights pol-
icy, compared with its predecessors', is a desirable step for-
ward. In a relatively short time frame this Administration has
12. 124 CONG. REc. H4706 (daily ed. May 31, 1978).
13. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
424, 92 Stat. 947 § 109.
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made significant progress in elevating the priority given to
human rights in U.S. foreign policy, and has had a noticeable
impact on human rights conditions abroad. 4 However, the in-
ternational promotion of human rights is an extremely difficult
task with no ready formulas or easily achieved results. It is
hoped that the Administration will continue its efforts toward
the utilization of the available bilateral and multilateral chan-
nels for such promotional activities.
14. Thirtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 79 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. 1 (Jan. 1979).
